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Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Wilderness Society:
The Dismissal of the Private Attorney General
Plaintiff, The Wilderness Society, obtained a preliminary injunction bar-
ring the Secretary of the Interior from issuing right-of-way permits to the
Alyeska Pipeline Service Company for the portion of the Alaska pipeline
which would -traverse land owned by the United States.' After the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the trial court's decision to
dissolve the injunction and dismiss the complaint,2 Congress enacted legisla-
tion authorizing construction of the pipeline.3 Consequently, the sole issue
requiring judicial resolution was plaintiff's request for an award of attorney's
fees. While statutory authorization for an award was absent, and the present
exceptions to the American rule against fee shifting were inapplicable, the
court of appeals held plaintiff was entitled to one-half the full award from
Alyeska for fulfilling the role of a private attorney general. 4 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.5 Held, reversed: Federal courts
lack the equitable power to award attorney's fees when the plaintiff acts as a
private attorney general in vindicating rights conferred by the laws of the
United States. Such an award is a policy determination reserved to the
discretion of Congress, and absent statutory authorization an award of
attorney's fees is impermissible. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Wilder-
nessSociety, 95 S. Ct. 1612, 44 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1975).
I. THE RULE AGAINST FEE SHIFTING AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
The traditional American rule precludes the taxing of attorney's fees; 6
however, pursuant to statutory authorization and the courts' equitable pow-
ers, 7 exceptions have developed. Federal statutes authorizing fee awards are
1. Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970). For a detailed
narrative of this litigation see Dominick & Brody, The Alaska Pipeline: Wilderness
Society v. Morton and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 23 AM. U.L. REV.
337 (1973).
2. The Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
3. Act of Nov. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576.
4. The Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Because of
28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970), the United States could not be compelled to contribute the
other one-half of the fee award.
5. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. The Wilderness Soc'y, 419 U.S. 823 (1974).
6. For a history of the development of the rule in America, see, e.g., Falcon, Award
of Attorney's Fees in Civil Rights and Constitutional Litigation, 33 MD. L. REv. 379(1973); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 202 (1966); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden
Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216 (1967).
7. Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1928), rev'd
on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1929). See notes 15-31 infra and accompanying text.
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both mandatory" and discretionary.9 Judicially created exceptions originally
fell into -the categories of groundless litigation' ° and the common fund
theory."I
In applying the groundless litigation, or bad faith rule, courts originally
examined the nature of the defendant's conduct to determine whether a fee
award was proper. 1 2 However, the courts recognized that -the aggrieved
plaintiff's rights were being ignored and liberalization of the rule would be
required as an additional sanction.'i Emphasis shifted from the examination
of the defendant's misconduct to the need to alleviate the plaintiff's financial
burden of litigation intended to vindicate constitutional rights.14
A second exception to the American rule, the common fund theory,
prevents the unjust enrichment of a class of individuals entitled to a fund
created or protected at the expense of the actual litigant. 15  The strict
application of the common fund theory was relaxed in Sprague v. Ticonic
National Bank,'6 where the plaintiff's failure to allege that she represented a
class, or established a fund, or both, was not dispositive. 7 The Court found
an award of fees proper because plaintiff by establishing her own claim to
the fund necessarily established the claims of other individuals to the same
fund."' While the trend of decisions indicated a relaxed approach to the
application of the fund theory,' 9 the Supreme Court nearly halted thirty
8. See, e.g., Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); Railway Labor Act, § 3, 45
U.S.C. § 153(p) (1970); Communications Act of 1934, § 206, 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1970);
Interstate Commerce Act, § 16, 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1970).
9. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, § 2(g)(2)(B), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(2)(B)
(Supp. I, 1975); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970); Civil Rights Act of
1964, §§ 204(b), 706(k), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5(k) (1970).
10. Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1928), rev'd
on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1929); 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 94.77121, at
1709 (2d ed. 1974, as supplemented). The purpose of the fee award in this instance is to
protect honest litigants and discourage abuse of the courts. See Comment, Court
Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 660
(1974).
11. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1,882). For a discussion of the fund
theory in the context of litigation serving private interests see Dawson, Lawyers and
Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597 (1974).
12. Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963). See generally Dawson, Law-
yers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1975);
Comment, Allowance of Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Litigation Where the Action is
Not Based on a Statute Providing for an Award of Attorney Fees, 41 U. CIN. L. REV.
405 (1972); Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General": ludicial
Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HAST. L.J. 733 (1973).
13. Clark v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966).
14. Cato v. Parham, 293 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 403 F.2d 12 (8th Cir.
1968).
15. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882); Comment, The Changing Ameri-
can Rule Against Attorney Fee Shifting: Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. and Hall v.
Cole, 28 Sw. L.J. 542 (1974). See also Dawson, supra note 12.
16. 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Comment, supra note 15, at 545. In Sprague plaintiff
established a lien on bonds securing a trust deposit. 307 U.S. at 163.
17. 307 U.S. at 166-67.
18. Id. This conclusion was predicated upon the application of the doctrine of stare
decisis.
19. See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); Bosch v.
Meeker Cooperative Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960);
Abrams v. Textile Realty Corp., 97 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1949). See also Comment,
supra note 15, at 544-47.
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years of growth in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.2"
After establishing a deliberate infringement of trademark rights protected by
the Lanham Act,21 plaintiff requested an award of attorney's fees. In
rejecting the request, the Court distinguished Sprague,22 found the recog-
nized exceptions inapplicable, and the equitable power of the courts circum-
scribed. 23 The decision was predicated on the finding -that Congress provided
meticulously detailed remedies in the Act 24 and failed to authorize a fee
award. 2
5
In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. 26 plaintiffs brought a derivative action
and proved the defendant made materially misleading statements in a proxy
solicitation. 27 Addressing plaintiff's prayer for attorney's fees, the Supreme
Court distinguished Fleischmann because, unlike the Lanham Act, the
Securities Act of 1934 did not provide meticulously detailed remedies. 28 The
Fleischmann holding that statutory silence indicated congressional intent to
deny fee shifting was assessed in Mills as mandating the use of court-created
exceptions. 29 The Court found the traditional fund exception inapposite,
stating that the lack of monetary recovery from which the fees could be paid
did not prevent an award,3 0 and the vindication of statutory policy conferred
a "substantial benefit" justifying an award of fees. 3 1
The leading decision involving the shifting of attorney's fees pursuant to
the private attorney general theory was rendered per curiam in Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises.32 Plaintiff sought to enjoin racial discrimination in
20. 386 U.S. 714 (1967); Comment, supra note 15, at 549.
21. Lanham Act, §§ 1-50, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970).
22. The Court stated: "[Nlone of the considerations which supported the exception
recognized in Sprague are present here." 386 U.S. at 720.
23. Id. at 719-20.
24. Id. at 719. Section 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1970), as
amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117 (Supp. I, 1975), provides that the plaintiff may recover the
defendant's profits, any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and costs of the action. In
assessing the damages sustained, the court may enter judgment for such amount of actual
damage not to exceed three times the amount of the award.
25. 386 U.S. at 720-21.
26. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
27. The complaint alleged defendant's actions violated section 14(a) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970), formerly ch. 404, § 14a, 48 Stat.
895 (1934) and SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1974).
28. 396 U.S. at 391.
29. Id. at 390-91.
30. Id. at 392.
31. Id. at 396. In Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973), the Supreme Court followed
Mills, by awarding fees for the violation of plaintiff's right to free speech secured by the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2)(1970). The vindication of plaintiff's right to free speech conferred a "substantial
benefit" on fellow union members whose rights were similarly threatened. 412 U.S. at 11.
As in Mills, the Court distinguished the Fleischmann interpretation of congressional
silence by holding that section 102 did not provide meticulously detailed remedies. Id.
Moreover, the inclusion of fee provisions in sections 201(c) and 501(b) of the Act, 29
U.S.C. §H 431(c), 501(b) (1970), did not indicate congressional intent to restrict a fee
award to those situations.
32. 390 U.S. 400 (1968); see authorities cited in Brief for Respondent at 67 n.91,
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. The Wilderness Soc'y, 95 S. Ct. 1612, 44 L. Ed. 2d 141(1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondent]; id. at 71, citing Derfner, Attorneys'
Fees in Pro Bono Publico Cases reprinted in Hearings on the Effect of Legal Fees on the
Adequacy of Representation Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests
of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 3 and 4, at 862 (1973); Com-




the operation of restaurants in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.33
The Supreme Court held that under the Act a successful plaintiff should
ordinarily recover attorney's fees unless special circumstances dictated other-
wise. 34 The decision was justified upon the finding that enforcement of the
Act would be relegated to private individuals unable to recover damages who
would act as "'private attorney[s] general,' vindicating a policy that Con-
gress considered of the highest priority."' 5
The decisions indicated that the Court did not consider itself confined by
'the strict fund theory. So long as meticulously detailed remedies were absent,
the ability to utilize the courts' equitable powers for awarding fees was
present. Despite absence of a monetary fund, vindication of statutory rights
was a sufficient benefit to justify the award of fees.
II. ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE Co. v. THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY
In Alyeska the Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's request for attorney's
fees, noting that the use of the private attorney general theory in Newman36
did not constitute a general grant of authority to apply the exception
whenever the courts deemed public policy to be furthered.37 Rather, con-
gressional silence should be interpreted as proscribing the equitable powers
of the courts to award fees despite plaintiffs' 'acting as private attorneys
general. 88 The Court's decision is predicated upon the inability, absent
legislative guidance, to make determinations that only certain statutes satisfy
the criteria of public importance.89 In addition, the function of private
citizens calling the Government to account is at odds with federal law40
precluding an award of fees against the United States.41
The Court determined that since Congress has neither repudiated the
judicially created exceptions to the American rule, nor altered the statutory
fee provision contained in section 1923,42 'an award of fees would invade the
legislative sphere.43 The Court's argument is not compelling. In light of the
judicially created exceptions to the traditional rule,44 congressional silence
might reasonably be interpreted as congressional acceptance or even authori-
zation of the courts' initiative in shifting fees. 45 Moreover, while the Court
admitted that previous exceptions -to the rule were fashioned through its in-
herent equitable powers, 46 the Court was unwilling to exercise those same
33. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 204(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1970).
34. 390 U.S. at 402, construing Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 204(b), 42 U.S.C. §
2000a-3(b) (1970).
35. 390 U.S. at 401-02 (footnote omitted).
36. Id. at 400.
37. 95 S. Ct. at 1624-25, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 156-57.
38. Id. at 1627, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 156-57.
39. Id. at 1625, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 157.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970).
41. 95 S. Ct. at 1626, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 158-59.
42. Fee Bill Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1970), provides a schedule of docket fees for
attorneys in the United States courts, admiralty appellate cases, and the manner of
payment of docket fees by the United States Attorney.
43. 95 S. Ct. at 1623, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 154-55.
44. See notes 6-11 supra and accompanying text.
45. 95 S. Ct. at 1633, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 167 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Hall v. Cole,
412 U.S. 1 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 390-91 (1970).
46. 95 S. Ct. at 1627, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 159.
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powers here. This failure to act contradicts previous statements that the
existence of a right implies all necessary and appropriate remedies. 47  When
Congress enacts legislation without providing detailed remedies, a sugges-
tion that -the courts may not exercise their inherent equitable powers leads to
the untenable conclusion that Congress has created a right without a remedy.
The failure of Congress to amend the statutory fee provision is irrelevant, for
as Justice Marshall, dissenting,48 pointed out, even in Fleischmann49 the
Court did not support its decision with this statute.50  In fact, the Court
denominated the fee statute a "general exception" to the traditional rule. 51
To support the application of a rule with one of its exceptions is a contradic-
tion in terms.
The Court suggested that acceptance of the private attorney general
exception would result in a judicial guessing game on the application of the
exception. 52 This fear is unfounded. Despite the Court's belittlement of
litigation on right-of-way permits, the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 was
enacted as a landmark conservation measure designed to permit the reasser-
tion of control over the use of public lands and to correct prior abuses. '3
Certain other rights, for example those protected by the Constitution, clearly
establish policies of the highest priority. 54 It would seem the Court would
permit an award of fees under the Open Housing Act of 1968, 55 which
provides for fees, 56 but would deny an award when suit was brought under
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.17 Yet the acts are essentially identical. The
gravamen of either action is racial discrimination, and the existence of
congressional and constitutional priorities is obvious. 58 Courts make case-by-
case determinations on the applications of rules; such a procedure could be
used in this situation. Even if the Court rejected this approach, Justice
Marshall has suggested guidelines worthy of adoption.59 To justify an award
of fees, the courts should determine that the right conferred is shared by the
public at large or a segment thereof; the plaintiff's financial interest in the
outcome normally would not justify incurring the expense of counsel; and the
47. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969); see Brief of the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Decision Below, at 17, Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. The Wilderness Soc'y, 95 S. Ct.
1612, 44 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1975); accord, Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 414
n.13 (1968); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
48. 95 S. Ct. at 1629, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 161.
49. 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
50. 95 S. Ct. at 1633, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 166.
51. 386 U.S. at 718 n.ll; see notes 6-11 yupra and accompanying text.
52. 95 S. Ct. at 1627, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 159-60; see Comment, The Allocation of
Attorney's Fees Alter Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. C. L. REv. 316, 334
(1971).
53. Brief for Respondent 40.
54. Falcon, supra note 6, at 418.
55. Open Housing Act of 1968, §§ 801-901, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1970).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c). This section states in relevant part: "The court may grant
as relief, as it deems appropriate . . . reasonable attorney fees in the case of a prevailing
plaintiff: Provided, That the said plaintiff in the opinion of the court is not financially
able to assume said attorney's fees."
57. Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). This section makes no
provision for attorney's fees.
58. Falcon, supra note 6, at 412.
59. 95 S. Ct. at 1635, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 169.
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defendant is capable of spreading the cost to the class benefitting from thelitigation. 60
,In applying these criteria to Alyeska, Justice Marshall concluded that
significant public benefits were derived from the revision of the Mineral
Leasing Act and a more thorough analysis of the environmental impact of
the pipeline.61 The second criterion was clearly met, since the only remedy
available was an injunction and the direct monetary benefits to the plaintiff
were "dwarfed" by the cost of litigation. 62 The discussion by Justice
Marshall of the third criterion was accurate and correct within the confines
of Alyeska but lacked forcefulness in its general applicability. He suggested
Alyeska Pipeline Service Company was the proper party to assume the cost
because it adopted the position of the Secretary of the Interior, and received
an economic benefit from improved protection of the physical integrity of the
pipeline. 8 The decision to bypass Congress by not seeking new legislation
and to secure the permits despite statutory restrictions was made originally by
Alyeska, not the Secretary.64 Moreover, Alyeska was a real party in interest
with a substantial economic stake in the pipeline and attempted to protect
this stake by actively participating in the litigation.6 5 As Justice Marshall
suggested, Alyeska is in an ideal position to distribute -the costs to the oil
consuming public.66
While the inability to assess the fee against the federal government is not
dispositive in this case, no adequate answer is provided for situations where
the federal government is -the proper party to bear the costs. Justice
Marshall's discussion is not persuasive on this point because in many
instances private citizens may challenge actions -taken by the Government. He
dismissed the issue because respondent failed to challenge the conclusion of
the court of appeals. 67  Assuming a response to the majority exists, the
dissent should not have felt restricted by institutional constraints6" to decide
only those matters actually before the Court.
The decision in Alyeska may result in a decrease of public interest
litigation and in severe restrictions on the application of the "substantial
benefits" doctrine.69 ,In our society, the necessity for having adequate
representation cannot be overstated;70 nevertheless, the threshold question of
whether to initiate litigation and the ability to obtain adequate representation
60. Id.
61. Id. The original environmental impact statement consisted of seven pages, while
the resulting statements constituted more than three thousand pages.
62. Id. at 1636, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 170.
63. Id. at 1636, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 170-71.
64. Brief for Respondent 73-74.
65. id. at 73-74, 77.
66. 95 S. Ct. at 1637, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 171; see Brief for Respondent 80-81.
67. 95 S. Ct. at 1636, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 170.
68. One of the primary constraints is the effect of stare decisis. The courts are aware
that the judicial system functions by previous decisions affecting the outcome of future
decisions. Therefore, attempts are made to assure the ratio decidendi of a case is
narrowly drawn. When the courts are required to decide a case on the basis of stare
decisis, maximum flexibility is retained.
69. See notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text.
70. Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation, 49 IowA L. REv.
75, 82 (1963).
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is dependent upon the distribution of litigation costs. 71 Under the present
system, many potential litigants are denied access to the courts because the
expense of litigation is greater than any possible recovery.72 Application of
the private attorney general theory would alleviate this problem by preserv-
ing class assets, 73 promoting class action suits,74 and thereby equalizing
access to the courts for groups seeking to litigate significant issues. 75
However, with rejection of this theory, the cost of correcting the result of
disobedience to constitutional or statutory command falls on those seeking
obedience, not those who disobeyed. 76 A wealthy defendant may participate
in costly dilatory tactics aimed at forcing his less fortunate opponent to
accept an unfavorable settlement or to abandon a valid claim. 77 Plaintiffs
will be deterred 78 when only injunctive relief is sought because -the litigation
cost is high 79 and the cases are not particularly attractive to many attor-
neys.80 Private enforcement of pollution laws8l and protection of the
consumer 2 may become beyond reach. In essence, whether or not it was the
Court's intention, Alyeska creates a system designed to forestall litigation.83
Implicit in the rejection of the fee request in Alyeska was the severely
circumscribed future application of -the "substantial benefits" doctrine estab-
lished in Mills.8 4 As in Mills, no meticulously detailed remedies were
present 3 which would indicate congressional intent to preclude the courts
from exercising their equitable powers.8 6 Additionally, while no monetary
recovery from which fees could be paid was obtained, the decisions in
Sprague and Mills indicate -that whether the award came from a fund or
from assessment against the losing party was not controlling. 7 Finally, there
71. Note, supra note 6, at 1230.
72. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 443 (1963); Allowance of Attorney Fees in
Civil Rights Actions, 7 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 381, 382 (1971); Note, supra note 6,
at 1230.
73. Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards,
69 HARV. L. REV. 658, 682 (1956). When a class of individuals vindicates its statutory
rights, its financial resources are not depleted by counsel fees when the fees are taxed to
the losing party.
74. Id. Because plaintiff's financial resources will not be depleted, the likelihood of
litigating an issue is greater; see notes 70-73 supra and accompanying text; notes 78-
80 infra and accompanying text.
75. Comment, supra note 10, at 657. See also Falcon, supra note 6, at 409.
76. Falcon, supra note 6, at 387.
77. Ehrenzweig, Shall Counsel Fees Be Allowed, 26 CALIF. ST. B.J. 107 (1951);
Hornstein, supra note 73, at 658; Note, supra note 6, at 1222.
78. Kuenzel, supra note 70, at 84; see Note, Civil Actions for Damages Under the
Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TEXAS L. REV. 1015, 1035 (1967); note 72 supra.
79. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 443 (1963); Allowance of Attorney Fees in
Civil Rights Actions, supra note 72, at 381. A trial in the district court with an appeal
to the circuit court and a petition for certiorari may cost between $15,000 and $18,000.
Id.
80. See note 72 supra.
81. Comment, supra note 15, at 555. In The Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d
1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court recognized that the plaintiff might not have undertaken
the litigation unless the fees were taxed because the bill of costs indicated that plaintiff's
counsel had spent in excess of 4,500 hours since the original complaint was dismissed in
the district court. 495 F.2d at 1032.
82. Comment, supra note 52, at 330; see note 81 supra.
83. Cf. Falcon, supra note 6, at 387; see notes 70-80 supra and accompanying text.
84. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
85. See notes 26-31 supra.
86. See notes 24 supra.
87. 95 S. Ct. at 1632, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 165-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting), citing
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was a "substantial benefit" derived in Alyeska, namely, the vindication of
statutory rights,88 the prevention of an environmental and economic disas-
ter,89 and the imposition of significant new requirements by Congress which
protected the public interest and reflected the environmental, technological,
and other concerns which prompted the original litigation. 90 The sole
significant distinction between the two cases rests in the nature of the
parties-in Mills the plaintiffs were private individuals, while in Alyeska
the plaintiffs were environmental groups litigating in the public rather than
their own private interests. Because Alyeska appears to fulfill the criteria
established in Mills, and the Court did not apply this holding,91 the
conclusion is inevitable that Mills must be restricted to its facts.
III. CONCLUSION
The exceptions to the American rule against fee shifting have been
keeping pace with and encouraging litigation essential to our national well-
being. With Alyeska the Court may have adversely affected that prosperity.
While the traditional exceptions to the American rule appear viable, the
principles in Mills have been foresaken and the "substantial benefits"
doctrine has been severely restricted. With the high cost of litigation-a very
real consideration in determining whether or not to litigate-the Court has
indicated a desire to prevent an influx of public interest suits.
Neal B. Shniderman
Expanding Protection for Permissible Trademark Uses: Boston
Professional Hockey Association v. Dallas Cap &
Emblem Manufacturing, Inc.
Dallas Cap & Emblem, a manufacturer of embroidered cloth emblems,
sought an exclusive license from National Hockey League Service, Inc., for
the manufacture and sale of embroidered emblems depicting trademarks of
the National Hockey League and its member teams.' Failing in its attempt
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166-67 (1939) and Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392-94 (1970).
88. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, § 28, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970); National Environ-
mental Protection Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
89. Brief for Respondent 46-47 n.64, citing The Alaska Pipeline, SMrrIHSONiAN,
Oct. 1974, at 38, 42 (statement by Russell E. Train, former Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency).
90. Brief for Respondent 50-51, citing The Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d
1026, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
91. See notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text.
1. A trademark is defined by the Lanham Act as "any word, name, symbol, or de-
vice or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to
identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others." 15
[Vol. 29
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to obtain the license, Dallas Cap & Emblem proceeded to manufacture the
emblems, which constituted substantial duplications of the trademark sym-
bols and were not connected with any goods or services. The finished prod-
uct was sold to sporting goods stores without prior authorization by the NHL
or its teams. None of the marks was copyrighted.2
The NHL and thirteen of its teams brought suit for damages and injunc-
tive relief, alleging violations of section 323 and section 43(a)4 of the Lan-
ham Act, 5 and additionally asserting a common law cause of action for un-
fair competition. The district court denied injunctive relief under sections
32 and 43(a), but found that the sale and manufacture of the emblems con-
stituted unfair competition and enjoined further sale of the emblems with-
out appropriate disclaimers stating that the emblems were not authorized by
the plainfiffs.6 The court denied all claims for damages. An appeal was
taken by all plaintiffs. Held, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and re-
manded: The NHL and each of its teams are entitled to protection against
the unauthorized, intentional duplication of their trademarks on embroidered
cloth emblems to be sold to the public as a patch for attachment to wearing
U.S.C. § 1127 (1970). A service mark is "a mark used in the sale or advertising of
services to identify the services of one person and distinguish them from the services
of others." Id. The terms "trademark" and "service mark" are used interchangeably and
the standards for the protection of each are identical. Mr. Travel, Inc. v. V.I.P. Travel
Serv., Inc., 268 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ill. 1966). The term "trademark" shall be used
herein to designate both trademarks and service marks.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 grants to Congress the power to enact legislation for
copyright protection; trademarks are protected by common law and state and federal
statutes. The test for infringement in the use of copyrighted materials is whether the
material has been copied, whereas the test for alleged trademark infringement requires
more than a mere showing of reproduction of the protected mark. See Hollywood Jew-
elry Mfg. Co. v. Dushkin, 136 F. Supp. 738, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); 17 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2,
12 (1970); note 22 inlra and accompanying text. Because the burden of proof for al-
leged trademark infringement is greater than that for copyright infringement, the degree
of protection is correspondingly less than that provided under a copyright. However,
trademarks retain their protected status so long as they are used in connection with a
business or trade, while 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) provides copyright protection for 28
years with renewal available for an additional 28 years only. Copyright protects artis-
tic, literary, and scientific works while the recognition of trademarks serves an entirely
different function. See 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1970); note 1 supra.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1970) provides in part that:(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering
for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or
in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive;
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies herein-
after provided.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970) provides in part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with
any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a falsedesignation of origin, or any false description or representation, including
words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same,
and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce . . . shall
be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the localityfalsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said locality
is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be
damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970).
6. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 360 F.
Supp. 459 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
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apparel. Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction prohibiting further manu-
facture and sale of the emblems, and authorization disclaimers suggested by
the district court are insufficient to remedy the wrong. Boston Professional
Hockey Association v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing, Inc., 510 F.2d
1004 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3069 (U.S. Aug.
5, 1975) (No. 75-156).
I. ELEMENTS OF TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND INFRINGEMENT
In medieval Europe merchants found it necessary to attach a proprietary
mark to their goods to signify ownership should the goods be recovered after
being stolen or lost at sea. Because trade and production were usually local
in nature, the consumer was generally acquainted with the manufacturer of
the goods he purchased. In time, purchasers came to rely on the proprie-
tary mark as a designation of the origin of the goods. 7 However, due to mod-
ern business techniques8 such as franchising, component manufacturing, and
wholesaling, today's consumer seldom knows or cares about the particular
source of the goodsY Rather, he is more concerned that they come
from the same source or reach the market through the same channels of trade
as goods which previously bore the same trademark.' 0 The mark is also a
representation that goods bearing the same mark are or should be of similar
quality."
The trademark is used by the manufacturer to identify his goods and to
distinguish them from those of others. 12 It also serves as a symbol of the mer-
chant's goodwill' 3 and as a vehicle for advertising.' 4  The trademark is a
valuable asset to its owner-in some instances the most valuable asset his
business may possess.
Although early cases of trademark infringement were based on the com-
7. For a definitive treatment of the history of trademark law see F. SCHECHTER,
THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADEMARKS (1925) [herein-
after cited as SCHECHTER]. See generally R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES (3d ed. 1967); Treece & Stephenson, A Look at
American Trademark Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 547 (1975).
8. See Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REv.
813, 814 (1927). The law does not require the owner of the trademark to be the manu-
facturer of the goods to which it is attached. Rouss, Inc. v. Winchester Co., 300 F.
706, 722-23 (2d Cir. 1924).
9. See Family Circle, Inc. v. Family Circle Associates, 332 F.2d 534, 539 (3d
Cir. 1964); SCHECHTER 149-50.
10. The distinction between the consumer knowing the specific source of goods and
merely being conscious that the goods emanate from the same source appears tenuous
until one recognizes that infringers have sought to defend their actions on the ground
that the consumer was not deceived into buying defendant's goods because the consumer
never actually knew the true source of the products. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke
Co., 254 U.S. 143 (1920); Walter Baker & Co. v. Slack, 130 F. 514 (7th Cir. 1904);
SCHECHTER 150. See also Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960,
963 (2d Cir. 1918); Schechter, supra note 8, at 816.
11. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. State, 225 S.W. 791, 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1920, no writ); Isaacs, Traffic in Trade-Symbols, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1210, 1220 (1931).
12. See note 1 supra. See also United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248
U.S. 90 (1918); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877).
13. See, e.g., Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 273 U.S. 629 (1927);
Makara, Good Will, Ill Will and Trademarks, 39 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 78 (1957).
14. See, e.g., Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203
(1942); Schechter, supra note 8, at 831.
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mon law actions of deceit and fraud,' 5 contemporary infringement actions in
state and federal courts are governed by statute and the law of unfair compe-
tition. The Lanham Act, 16 the federal statute dealing with trademarks, pro-
vides for registration of trademarks 17 as well as remedies for infringement
of an owner's rights to the exclusive use of his mark.' 8 The protection pro-
vided by the Lanham Act is supplemented by the common law action for
alleged unfair competition.' 9 Although the Lanham Act's protection is not
coextensive with the law of unfair competition, 20 the facts that support an
action for infringement under the Lanham Act are substantially identical to
those in a suit for unfair competition. 21 Regardless of the form of action
chosen by the plaintiff, whether it be grounded in statute or based on the
law of unfair competition, the test for trademark infringement is reminiscent
of the older common law actions for deceit and fraud.
The test for trademark infringement is whether the use of the alleged in-
fringing mark is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive. 22  The
rule is sometimes stated as "whether ordinary purchasers, buying under the
usual conditions in the trade and exercising ordinary care, would likely be
induced to purchase the article to which the accused trade-mark is affixed,
believing it to be the plaintiff's article."' 23  There need not be a finding of
15. See Crawshay v. Thompson, 134 Eng. Rep. 146 (C.P. 1842); ScHECUTE 142-
43. Reluctantly, the courts came to recognize a trademark as a species of property.
Such recognition by the courts allowed equity to intervene and grant injunctive relief
instead of damages, which had been the only remedy provided for an action in deceit
or fraud. Millington v. Fox, 40 Eng. Rep. 956 (Ch. 1838). In the Trademark Cases,
100 U.S. 82 (1879), the Supreme Court characterized a trademark as property, but failed
to express its opinion on the scope of the right appurtenant to this form of property.
In United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918), the Court backed
away from the expansive language in the Trademark Cases, indicating that a trademark
is only a right to the exclusive use of the mark in certain instances and is not property
except in connection with an existing business. See also Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); Callmann, Unfair Competition Without Competition?
The Importance of the Property Concept in the Law of Trademarks, 95 U. PA. L. REv.
443 (1947).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970).
17. Id. §§ 1051-52, 1113, 1127.
18. Id. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a).
19. The issue in a suit for unfair competition in the use of another's trademark is
whether the defendant is "passing off" his goods as those of the plaintiff. Volkswagen-
werk Aktiengesellschaft v. Rickard, 492 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 1974).
20. The law of unfair competition is not limited to trademark infringement. More
precisely, unfair competition could be termed "unfair trading." See Witherow Steel
Corp. v. Donner Steel Co., 31 F.2d 157, 183 (W.D.N.Y. 1929); Callmann, What is Un-
fair Competition?, 28 GEO. L.J. 585 (1940). Other acts which do not constitute trade-
mark infringement but are considered unfair competition include the false representation
and disparagement of another's goods. Nims, Unfair Competition by False Statements
or Disparagement, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 63 (1933).
21. See Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 325(1938). Trademark law is but a part of the broader field of the law of unfair com-
petition. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); Hanover
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916).
22. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(d), 1114, 1125(a) (1970); United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877); American
Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1963) (interpreting 15 U.S.C.§ 1114 (1970)); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Properties, Inc., 307 F.2d 495 (2d Cir.
1962). See generally Comment, The Trademark Confusion Test-Good or Bad; Weak
or Strong?, 5 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 401 (1964).
23. Seven Up Co. v. Cheer Up Sales Co., 148 F.2d 909, 911 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 727 (1945).
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actual confusion but only that such confusion is likely. 24 However, the mere
possibility of confusion is insufficient to support a claim for relief. 25  Confu-
sion may exist between the protected mark and a similar mark2e or, if the
marks are identical, between goods of similar descriptive properties.27
A trademark exists only insofar as it is appurtenant to an existing trade
or business and is protected only if used in such capacity.28  When a trade-
mark is employed by others in a business unrelated to that of the mark's
owner it becomes more difficult to find a likelihood of confusion. To deter-
mine the reach of trademark protection in such cases, the courts must first
determine the scope of the business activities of the mark's owner.2 9  The
use of an alleged infringing mark violates the owner's right to its exclusive
use if it invades this area of protection, so that the purchaser is likely to be
induced to believe that the source of the goods is the owner of the mark.
If the scope of trademark protection is expanded to include such "collat-
eral" uses3 0-the use of a trademark on products and in businesses dissimilar
to those to which the trademark is customarily affixed-it will approach the
broad protection provided for copyrighted material.3 1  Yet, trademark pro-
tection does not reach as far as that provided for copyright. 32  Ownership
of a trademark does not prohibit its use by others for all purposes. Use of
the mark is not limited so long as its use does not deceive the public or jeop-
ardize the owner's goodwill. 38
The scope of trademark protection is inversely proportional to a court's
interpretation and application of the confusion test. The less required by a
24. See, e.g., Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609 (7th Cir.
1965), where the court reversed the district court's finding of negligible evidence of ac-
tual confusion, emphasizing that confusion need only be likely and that such likelihood
may be proved without any actual evidence of confusion. The test for likelihood of con-
fusion is to determine a patron's state of mind and his possible reaction when confronted
with plaintiff's and defendant's marks. See also World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's
New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1971); Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chese-
brough-Pond's, Inc., 281 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1960); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Charles Pfizer
& Co., 265 F.2d 385 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 819 (1959).
25. See, e.g., Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794 (9th Cir.
1970).
26. See, e.g., Jerry Finn v. Cooper's, Inc., 292 F.2d 555 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (picture
of a jockey on underwear); International Harvester Co. v. Howard Worthington, Inc.,
175 U.S.P.Q. 378 (T.T.A.B. 1972) (the letters IH and HW arranged in similar config-
urations).
27. See, e.g., Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, Inc., 4 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1925) (use
of the name "Rolls-Royce" on automobiles and radio tubes); HMH Publishing Co. v.
Playboy Records, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. I11. 1958) (use of the word "Playboy"
on magazines and records). But see John Walker & Sons v. Modern Shoe Co., 213 F.2d
322 (C.C.P.A. 1954) (same name on whiskey and shoes not likely to confuse); General
Motors Corp. v. Cadillac Marine & Boat Co., 226 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Mich. 1964) (no
confusion where the name "Cadillac" appeared on automobiles and boats).
28. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 96 (1918).
29. The mere registration of a trademark for particular use does not restrict the
mark's use on other goods or in other trades. See Knapp-Monarch Co., 296 F.2d 230
(C.C.P.A. 1961); 37 C.F.R. § 2.85(g) (1974).
30. See J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 5.05[10] (1974).
31. See note 2 supra.
32. In United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918), the Court
said: "In truth, a trade-mark confers no monopoly whatever in a proper sense, but is
merely a convenient means for facilitating the protection of one's good-will in trade by
placing a distingu:shing mark or symbol-a commercial signature-upon the mer-
chandise or the package in which it is sold." Id. at 98.
33. See Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924).
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court for showing of a likelihood of confusion will correspondingly widen the
ambit of protection for a particular trademark. Any such expansion of pro-
tection will necessarily involve a broadening of the acceptable uses to which
a trademark owner may apply his mark.
II. BOSTON PROFESSIONAL HOCKEY ASSOCIATION V. DALLAS CAP &
EMBLEM MANUFACTURING, INC.
The principal business of a professional sports organization is the prepara-
tion for and participation in sporting events. However, a seemingly unrelated
activity, such as the sale of sweaters, caps, pennants, and similar parapher-
nalia bearing a team's trademark, is big business, and teams have fought suc-
cessfully -to protect the exclusive right -to affix their trademarks to such
items.3 4 The novel situation presented in Dallas Cap & Emblem was
that a reproduction of the trademark itself had been manufactured and sold
unattached to any goods or services.3 5  Plaintiffs conclusively established
three of the elements necessary for a section 1114 cause of action 36 in that
the emblems were substantial duplications of plaintiffs' marks, the sale of the
emblems was unauthorized, and the emblems were sold in interstate com-
merce. The significant issues which demanded the court's attention were
whether the plaintiffs' trademarks were used in connection with the sale of
goods and whether such use was likely to cause confusion.3 7
Trademark law contemplates that a mark will obtain the status of a pro-
tected property right only when it is affixed to goods or services. 38  Without
the designs embroidered on the cloth patches defendant's product would be
valueless to hockey fans desiring to purchase emblems depicting the marks
of their favorite teams. This identification with the plaintiffs' trademarks is,
of course, one of the functions a trademark was intended to serve. A trade-
mark sells the goods to which it is affixed. The plaintiffs' marks were, in
essence, the product being sold and the embroidered cloth emblems were the
"goods" to which the trademark was attached even though the motif covered
the entire face of the product. The court found, therefore, that the trade-
34. See National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Consumer Enterprises, Inc.,
180 U.S.P.Q. 90 (I11. Ct. App. 1973), where the court found the manufacture and sale
of embroidered cloth emblems similar to those manufactured by Dallas Cap & Emblem
created a likelihood of confusion sufficient to uphold the injunction granted by the lower
court pending trial. See also Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Reliable Knitting
Works, Inc., 178 U.S.P.Q. 274 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (injunction prohibiting sale and manu-
facture of knitted caps with emblems bearing team's trademark attached thereto).
35. 510 F.2d 1004, 1010 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3069
(U.S. Aug. 5, 1975) (No. 75-156).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1970); see note 3 supra.
37. In 1962 Congress rewrote § 1114(1)(a) and deleted the phrase "purchasers as
to the source of origin of such goods or services" following the words "likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1952), as
amended, (1970). Courts have interpreted this as an attempt to "outlaw the use of
trademarks which are likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception of any kind, not
merely of purchasers nor simply as to source of origin." Syntex Laboratories, Inc. v.
Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971). But see Redken Labora-
tories, Inc. v. Clairol, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 1301, 1305 n.10 (C.D. Cal. 1972); S. REP.
No. 2107, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1962).
38. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).
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marks were used "in connection with" the sale of goods 9 no less than if the
emblems had been attached to knitted caps. 40
The defendant was correct in claiming that the cloth emblems were copies
of an ornament produced by the plaintiffs. However, the fact that a product
is capable of being sold as ornamentation does not preclude protection for
the trademark owner. 41  Olin Corp.42 concerned the defendant's unauthor-
ized use of plaintiff's trademark displayed on the front of t-shirts. The
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board held that plaintiff would be denied regis-
tration of its mark only if the value of the symbol was derived solely from
its use as ornamentation, but noted that if the mark could serve in any ca-
pacity as a representation of source it qualified for registration as a trade-
mark.43
The purchaser seldom knows the actual source of the goods he purchases. 44
The court recognized the fact that a typical purchaser might know that the
trademarks emanated from the teams and would not be deceived in that re-
spect.45 However, the confusion test is no longer restricted in scope to decep-
tion as to the source of origin 46 and the court refused to so limit the confines
of its inquiry.47
If the purchaser relies on the mark as a symbol of something other than
the particular source of the goods,48 he is nonetheless being deceived. The
degree to which plaintiff must show a likelihood of confusion will depend
upon the strength and notoriety of his mark and the extent to which a typi-
cal purchaser is likely to rely upon the mark when buying the goods.49 The
likelihood of confusion, therefore, lies in the fact the hockey fan would rely
on the mark as the "official" trademark of the teams when purchasing the
emblems.50
39. 510 F.2d at 1011.
40. See Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Reliable Knitting Works, Inc., 178U.S.P.Q. 274 (E.D. Wis. 1973), wherein the court enjoined defendant's use of plaintiff's
mark on knitted caps.
41. Compare Wyatt Earp Enterprises, Inc. v. Sachman, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 621(S.D.N.Y. 1958), with Eagle-Freedman-Roedelbeim Co. v. Allison Mfg. Co., 204 F.
Supp. 679 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
42. 181 U.S.P.Q. 182 (T.T.A.B. 1973).
43. Closely related are those cases in which the aesthetic characteristics of a product
and not the trademark itself triggered the sale. Such characteristics are considered
"functional" and not subject to trademark protection. See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225(1964); Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952). Commentators,
although in agreement with the results, have criticized the reasoning in the Sears and
Compco decisions. See Leeds, The Impact of Sears and Compco, 55 TRADEMARK REP.
188 (1965). The court in Dallas Cap & Emblem found the principles of the functionalproduct doctrine to be inapplicable where the "design or symbol has no demonstrated
value other than its significance as the trademark of a hockey team." 510 F.2d at 1013.
44. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Girl Scouts of the United States v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), where the court found that posters depicting a pregnant
Girl Scout would not lead supporters of the organization to believe the posters emanated
from the Girl Scouts.
46. See note 37 supra.
47. 510 F.2d at 1012.
48. Id.
49. See notes 10, 11 supra.
50. The scope of the protection afforded a mark will depend in part upon the
strength of the mark. Sunbeam Furniture Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., 191 F.2d 141, 144-
45 (9th Cir. 1951). See also Pease v. Scott County Milling Co., 5 F.2d 524, 526 (E.D.
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It is unlikely that a potential purchaser of defendant's emblems would be
anyone other than a person familiar with the teams' trademarks. A con-
sumer in the market for embroidered emblems would not be led to believe
that the source of the trademark was someone other than the plaintiffs. The
deception lies in the fact that the defendant intentionally manufactured and
sold the emblems knowing that potential purchasers would identify plain-
tiffs' trademarks on defendant's product and buy them on the basis of such
identification. 51 Confusion, the court stated, was "self-evident from the na-
ture of defendant's use of plaintiffs' marks."'5 2 The plaintiffs' satisfactory
showing of a likelihood of confusion was also sufficient to support a claim
of "false representation of origin" under section 1125.58
The court found the disclaimer of authorization ordered by the district
court insufficient to remedy the confusion and harm created by defendant's
use of plaintiffs' marks. 54 This aspect of the case is significant when con-
sidered in light of the fact that such disclaimers are usually adequate to rem-
edy the confusion. 5 The court, however, was referring only to the inade-
quacy of disclaimers when an exact duplication covers the entire face of the
product. A disclaimer might be adequate if applied to an emblem which
constitutes an exact duplication because the application of such a disclaimer
would alter the motif which previously covered the face of the product.
This, in itself, would create substantial dissimilarity between the marks and
be adequate to alleviate any misconception as to the emblems being an "of-
ficial" team product. Should a court favor this reasoning, however, the in-
fringer's victory might be a hollow one. Consumers seeking an "official"
product would probably be unwilling to purchase emblems which boldly dis-
claimed any authorization by the teams. A disclaimer applied to the face
of emblems covered solely by plaintiffs' trademarks would likely defeat the
defendant's primary purpose of trading on the goodwill and sales appeal
generated by the plaintiffs' trademarks.
Finally, the district court was worried lest it create a monopoly similar to
a copyright monopoly by granting injunctive relief to the plaintiffs.56 The
circuit court was correct when it pointed out that such would not be
the case.57 Admittedly, the plaintiffs could not expect protection for the
exclusive use of their trademarks on every conceivable product or service.
Mo. 1925). In Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.
1961), the court noted variables which a court might utilize in finding a likelihood of
confusion: "[T]he strength of his mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks,
the proximity of the products. . . the quality of defendant's product, and the sophistica-
tion of the buyers."
51. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.
1963); Northam Warren Corp. v. Universal Cosmetic Co., 18 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1927).
52. 510 F.2d at 1012.
53. Id. at 1012-13; see note 4 supra. The court found substantial evidence to sup-
port a claim for unfair competition and affirmed the district court on this point.
54. 510 F.2d at 1013.
55. In Societe Comptoir de L'Industrie Cotonniere Establissements Boussac v. Alex-
ander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962), the court found no confusion
where a rival of Christian Dior truthfully labeled his garments as copies of Dior or-
iginals. See also Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968); Livermore, On
Uses of a Competitor's Trademark, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 30, 40 (1969).
56. 360 F. Supp. at 464.
57. 510 F.2d at 1014.
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The court found persuasive the fact that the sale of embroidered cloth em-
blems bearing the teams' trademarks was within the scope of the business
activities of a professional sports organization. 58 The teams had, in fact,
either engaged in or authorized the sale of similar embroidered cloth emblems
as well as other products bearing their trademarks.59 Through their use of
the marks, plaintiffs had acquired a property right in them which extended
to the reproduction and sale of embroidered cloth emblems bearing their
trademarks.
III. CONCLUSION
To keep pace with the competitive demands of business an ever increas-
ing number of entrepreneurs are choosing a more direct route to success by
appropriating existing trademarks to their own use. In response, the courts
are widening the scope of a trademark owner's right to the exclusive use of
his mark. Refusing to confine itself to the strict source of origin test, the court
in Dallas Cap & Emblem found a likelihood of confusion in the fact that de-
fendant knew the consuming public would rely solely on the plaintiffs' trade-
marks in purchasing its emblems. The apparent lack of confidence in dis-
claimers as an adequate remedy for the confusion created by exact trademark
duplication is, in all probability, limited to similar fact situations where
the trademark symbol covers the entire face of the product. Any future fears
of possible monopolies for trademarks similar to copyright monopolies will
be alleviated by reasoned application of the likelihood of confusion test. For
the present, the traditional tests for trademark infringement seem adaptable
to contemporary trademark theory and adequate to aid in coping with situa-
tions as unique as that presented in Dallas Cap & Emblem.
Steve Amis
58. Id. at 1011.
59. In Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Reliable Knitting Works, Inc., 178
U.S.P.Q. 274, 276 (E.D. Wis. 1973), the court made note of the fact that the teams




lannelli v. United States-
Application of Wharton's Rule
Robert lannelli and others were indicted in Pennsylvania for conspiring to
violate and for violating federal gambling statutes.' The defendants moved
to dismiss the conspiracy count,2 contending that Wharton's Rule prohibited
prosecution for both conspiracy and violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955. The
district court dismissed the motion and the defendants were convicted for
both conspiracy and the substantive offense.3 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, affirming the lower court's decision, found
that prosecution for conspiracy and the substantive offense was permitted
despite Wharton's Rule, because more than the minimum number of defend-
ants set by the statute were indicted. 4 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari.5 Held, affirmed: Wharton's Rule is a mere judicial presumption which
does not prohibit prosecution for both conspiracy and the substantive offense
when legislative history indicates an intent that prosecution for both offenses
better serves to accomplish the ends for which the statute was enacted.
lannelli v. United States, 95 S. Ct. 1284, 43 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1975).
I. PRIOR APPLICATION OF WHARTON'S RULE
Conspiracy is often said to be an evil which may be prosecuted separately
from the evil which is the purpose of the collective agreement.6 Wharton's
1. Petitioners were indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970), which provides inpart:. (a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all
or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined not more than
$20,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section-(1) "illegal gambling business" means a gambling business which-(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in
which it is conducted;(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, man-
age, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and
(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation
for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of
$20,000 in any single day.
2. The conspiracy indictment was brought under the general conspiracy statute, 18
U.S.C. § 371 (1970), which provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States or any agency thereof in
any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any
act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
3. United States v. Iannelli, 339 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
4. lannelli v. United States, 477 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1974).
5. lannelli v. United States, 417 U.S. 907 (1974).
6. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that a conspiracy and its com-
pleted substantive offense are separate and distinct crimes. See Callanan v. United
States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961); Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11 (1954); Pink-
erton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946). This principle is based on the ration-
ale that a conspiracy magnifies the dangers attendant upon a substantive offense. In
United States v. Rabinowich, 283 U.S. 78, 88 (1915), the Court discussed the dangers
of conspiracy as follows:
For two or more to confederate and combine together to commit or
cause to be committed a breach of the criminal laws is an offense of the
gravest character, sometimes quite outweighing, in injury to the public, the
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Rule is an exception to that principle.7 The rule has traditionally been
applied to bar prosecution for conspiracy under statutes requiring concerted
activity. 8 For the most part, the rule has appeared in the case of two-party
crimes,9 such as bribery'0 and adultery." Application of Wharton's Rule
has been justified by the rationale that an agreement to commit a crime
requiring concerted activity poses no danger other than that inherent in the
substantive offense. 1 2
The rule has also been justified as an embodiment of legislative intent.' 3
When enacting a sanction for a crime requiring concerted activity, the
legislature presumably has taken into consideration any dangers posed by the
necessary agreement. Application of the rule insures that the prosecution will
not subvert legislative intent by utilizing a charge for conspiracy to obtain
punishment in excess of the statutory limit.14
While the appealing justifications for Wharton's Rule suggest pervasive
application, the courts have employed it only in limited situations. Wharton's
Rule will be applied if and only if (1) the substantive offense has been
committed,' 5 (2) concerted activity is logically necessary for the commission
mere commission of the contemplated crime. It involves deliberate plot-
ting to subvert the laws, educating and preparing conspirators for further
and habitual criminal practices. And it is characterized by secrecy, ren-
dering it difficult of detection, requiring more time for its discovery, and
adding to the importance of punishing it when discovered.
For a general discussion of this area see Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspir-
acy, 72 HARv. L. REV. 920, 968-71 (1959).
7. The rule, which was first formulated in an early edition of Wharton's text, es-
sentially provides: "An agreement by two persons to commit a particular crime cannotbe prosecuted as a conspiracy when the crime is of such a nature as to necessarily re-
quire the participation of two persons for its commission." I R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 191 (1957).
8. An application of the premise upon which the rule was later formulated first
appeared in Shannon v. Commonwealth, 14 Pa. 226 (1850). In that case a man and
a woman were indicted for conspiring to commit adultery. The court held that con-
spiracy was a necessary ingredient of the substantive offense; therefore, a separate
charge of conspiracy could not stand. For a discussion of the various aspects of the
rule see Developments in the Law, supra note 6, at 953-56.
9. The classic Wharton's Rule crimes are bribery, dueling, bigamy, incest, and
adultery. 2 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW 1746 (11th ed. 1912).
10. See People v. Wettengel, 18 Colo. 193, 58 P.2d 279 (1935). See also UnitedStates v. Sager, 49 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1931); United States v. Dietrich, 126 F. 664
(C.C.D. Neb. 1904).
11. See Miles v. State, 58 Ala. 390 (1877). See also State v. Law, 189 Iowa 910,179 N.W. 145 (1920); Shannon v. Commonwealth, 14 Pa. 226 (1850).
12. The premise upon which the rule was formulated was originally based on doublejeopardy principles. See Shannon v. Commonwealth, 14 Pa. 226 (1850). However, fol-lowing the rationale that prosecution for conspiracy is a sanction for collective agree-
ments posing additional dangers rather than a sanction for attempts, the Supreme Courthas held that double jeopardy does not prohibit a conspiracy charge. Carter v. Mc-Claughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902). See generally Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640(1946); People v. Purcell, 304 Ill. App. 215, 26 N.E.2d 153 (1940); Ireland, DoubleJeopardy and Conspiracy in the Federal Courts, 40 J. CRIM. L. & C. 445, 449-50 (1949).It has been suggested that the rule also be justified as a means of protecting a defendantfrom the disadvantages of a conspiracy prosecution. See Comment, Gambling Under
the Organized Crime Control Act: Wharton's Rule and the Odds on Conspiracy, 59
IOWA L. REV. 452, 455-57 (1973).
13. See, e.g., Vannata v. United States, 289 F. 424 (2d Cir. 1923); State v. Mc-
Laughlin, 132 Conn. 235, 44 A.2d 116 (1945).
14. United States v. New York C. & H.R.R., 146 F. 298 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906), aff'd,
212 U.S. 451 (1909); United States v. Cogan, 266 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
15. 2 F. WHARTON, supra note 9, at 1746, stating that "[w]hen the offense is not
consummated, and the conspiracy is one which by evil means a combination of persons
is employed to effectuate, this combination is of itself indictable." See United States
v. lannelli, 339 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
.[Vol. 29
NOTES
of the substantive offense, 16 (3) every ingredient of the conspiracy is
present in the completed crime,17 (4) the law defining the substantive
offense specifies a punishment for all the necessary participants,' 8 and (5)
the conspiracy does not involve a greater number of participants than the
number required to commit the substantive offense, the so-called "third party
exception."' 19 These limitations restrict application of the rule in order to
minimize the dangers 20 to society which are magnified by the collective
agreement inherent in a conspiracy to engage in criminal conduct.2 1
The narrow policy objectives for Wharton's Rule and the limitations set
forth above prevent expeditious application to modern statutes. 22 Such a
statute is section 1955. In an effort to combat the influx of organized crime,
Congress enacted section 1955 to provide federal prosecution for illegal
gambling activity. 23 The statute, which requires five participants, is aimed
primarily at large-scale gambling activity reaching interstate proportions. 24
The federal courts have been at odds with respect to the application of
Wharton's Rule to a section 1955 offense. 25 In United States v. Becker26 the
16. The rule will not be applied where one person could have committed the of-
fense alone. United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140 (1915); Heike v. United States, 227
U.S. 131 (1913). The definition of the offense presented by the statute will be the pri-
mary aid for determining the applicability of the rule. Lisansky v. United States, 31F.2d 846 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 873 (1929); United States v. Greenberg, 334
F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
17. In Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946), the Court stated:
"There are, of course, instances where a conspiracy charge may not be added to the sub-
stantive charge. One is where the agreement of two persons is necessary for the comple-
tion of the substantive crime, and there is no ingredient in the conspiracy which is not
present in the completed crime." See also United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974 (4th
Cir. 1973); Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1945).
18. Ex parte O'Leary, 53 F.2d 956 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 830 (1931);
Vannata v. United States, 289 F. 424 (2d Cir. 1923).
19. See State v. Clemson, 123 Iowa 524, 99 N.W. 139 (1904). The limitation is
based on the rationale that additional parties pose dangers greater than those taken into
consideration by the legislature when enacting the statute. See Old Monastery Co. v.
United States, 147 F.2d 905, 907-08 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945). For
a discussion of the "third party exception" see United States v. Figueredo, 350 F. Supp.
1031, 1035 (M.D. Fla. 1972), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Vaglica,
490 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974); Comment, supra note 12, at 460.
20. See note 6 supra.
21. The limitations insure that the rule will not be applied when the antisocial ef-fects of an offense reach persons who are not the necessary participants of that offense.
See Lisansky v. United States, 31 F.2d 846, 849 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 873(1929). The rule, therefore, will be consistent with the rationale that a conspiracy may
pose additional dangers to society.
22. Courts that have considered the rule have reached a variety of conclusions. See,
e.g., United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140 (1915) (transportation in interstate commercefor purposes of prostitution); Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 (1913) (fraud);
United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1973) (unlawful gambling); United States
v. Dietrich, 126 F. 664 (C.C.D. Neb. 1904) (bribing a United States Senator); United
States v. Shevlin, 212 F. 343 (D. Mass. 1913) (smuggling).
23. This statute was enacted as a part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
84 Stat. 922 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).24. Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 27, at 93, 194 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings]. Small-scale gambling operations which do not meet the requirements
set by § 1955 are still prohibited where existing state laws so provide. Id. at 194.
25. In this respect, the court in United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 985-86 (4th
Cir. 1973), stated: "The cases decided on the issue of what constitutes an unindictable
conspiracy reveal that Wharton's Rule, rather than being a rule, is a concept, the con-




court utilized the "third party exception" of Wharton's Rule 27 to hold that
the rule did not apply to bar an indictment for conspiracy to violate section
1955 where the conspiracy involved a greater number of participants than
the number necessary for commission of the substantive offense.28 This
reasoning was rejected, however, in United States v. Figueredo,29 where a
section 1955 conspiracy indictment against eight defendants charged with the
substantive offense was dismissed. The court in Figueredo, finding that the
Becker holding rested on a mistaken use of the "'third party exception,"
determined that the number of defendants indicted under section 1955 was
irrelevant.30 Rather, application of the rule depended upon the nature of the
additional defendants. 3 '
The conflict between the holdings of the Becker and Figueredo courts
involved a disagreement regarding the nature of the five-party requirement
in section 1955. A further difficulty is posed by the variety of activities
prohibited by the statute.s2 In United States v. Bobo s" the court stated that
Wharton's Rule is applicable to indictments under section 1955 only if the
conspiracy and the completed offense are so interrelated as to constitute one
single act.' 4 Reviewing the variety of activities involved in a violation of
section 1955, the court determined that participants could each engage in a
different number of prohibited activities.' 5 In addition, each activity could
involve separate agreements between some or all of the participants.' 6 Based
upon this reasoning, the court held that the section 1955 conspiracy and the
maintenance of the completed offense were separate acts precluding the
application of Wharton's Rule to dismiss the conspiracy indictment.' 7
The justifications for Wharton's Rule indicate that a clear expression of the
legislative intent in enacting section 1955 would put the controversy to rest.' 8
27. See note 19 supra.
28. 461 F.2d at 234. The court based its holding on United States v. Benter, 457
F.2d 1174 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972).
29. 350 F. Supp. 1031 (M.D. Fla. 1972), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United
States v. Vaglica, 490 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974).
30. 350 F. Supp. at 1035.
31. Id.; accord, United States v. Hunter, 478 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 857 (1973); United States v. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
32. Section 1955 provides a penalty for those who conduct, finance, manage, super-
vise, direct, or own all or part of an illegal gambling business. See note 1 supra.
33. 477 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1973).
34. Id. at 987.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. The court stated that three elements must co-exist before the rule may apply:
[T]he immediate effect of the act in view, which is the gist of the sub-
stantive offense, reaches only the participants therein; the agreement of
the participants is necessary for the completion of the substantive offense;
and the conspiracy must be in such close connection with the substantive
offense as to be inseparable from it.
Id.; accord, United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974); United States v. Benter, 457 F.2d 1174 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972); United States v. Whitaker, 372 F. Supp. 154
(M.D. Pa. 1974).
38. The Court in United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 357 (1926), stated:
All laws are to be given a sensible construction; and a literal application
of a statute, which would lead to absurd consequences, should be avoided
whenever a reasonable application can be given to it, consistent with the
legislative purpose . . . . In ascertaining that purpose, we may examine
the title of the Act . . . the source in previous legislation of the particular
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However, few courts have offered such an analysis.39 In an attempt
to interpret the legislative history for section 1955, the court in Figueredo
looked to 18 U.S.C. § 1511.40 The court found that Congress, by explicitly
providing a penalty for conspiracy in section 1511, had demonstrated an
ability to distinguish between a conspiracy and the general dangers posed by
organized gambling. 41 Accordingly, the court reasoned, the absence of a
similar provision in section 1955 indicates a congressional desire to preclude
an indictment for both conspiracy and the completed crime.42 While the line
of reasoning employed by the court in Figueredo is plausible, alternative
interpretations have been proposed. 43 One such interpretation 44 emphasizes
an attempt by Congress to insure against the infringement of a defendant's
rights. 45 The absence of language explicitly barring conviction for conspiring
to violate and violating section 1955 suggests that the policy considerations
underlying Wharton's Rule were weighed against the interests of society and
rejected. 40
II. IANNELLI V. UNITED STATES
The Supreme Court in lannelli determined that Wharton's Rule is pre-
sumed to apply to prosecutions under statutes requiring concerted activity
unless legislative intent is to the contrary. 47 Based on an examination of the
legislative history for section 1955, the Court concluded that the general
purpose set by Congress for that statute was to provide a means for
provision in question . . . and the legislative scheme or plan by which the
general purpose of the Act is to be carried out.
39. A few courts have offered a cursory analysis. See, e.g., Callanan v. United
States, 364 U.S. 587, 594 (1961); United States v. Kohne, 347 F. Supp. 1178, 1186
(W.D. Pa. 1972).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (1970) provides in part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to obstruct
the enforcement of the criminal laws of a State or political subdivision
thereof, with the intent to facilitate an illegal gambling business if-
(1) one or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of
such a conspiracy;(2) one or more of such persons is an official or employee, elected, ap-
pointed, or otherwise, of such State or political subdivision; and
(3) one or more of such persons conducts, finances, manages, super-
vises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business.
41. 350 F. Supp. 1031, 1036 (M.D. Fla. 1972), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
United States v. Vaglica, 490 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974).
42. 350 F. Supp. at 1036.
43. In United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1974), the court reasoned
that the concerted activity requirement in §§ 1955 and 1511 was only a jurisdictional
requirement unrelated to the criminal character of the prohibited conduct. The court
concluded that Congress had not viewed § 1955 as that type of offense to which Whar-
ton's Rule would apply. 489 F.2d at 559. The emphasis placed on the federal jurisdic-
tional aspects of § 1955 by Congress would appear to support this interpretation. See
REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REp. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
70-76 (1969).
44. See Note, Wharton's Rule and Conspiracy To Operate an Illegal Gambling Busi-
ness, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 613, 627 (1973).
45. Id. See also Hearings 94.
46. The legislative history mentions a desire "to produce an appropriate accommo-
dation between the interests of society in controlling crime and the rights of every in-
dividual . . . ." Id.
47. lannelli v. United States, 95 S. Ct. 1284, 43 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1975). The Court
determined the rule "has current vitality only as a judicial presumption, to be applied
in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary." Id. at 1292, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 625.
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controlling the increasing magnitude of organized crime. 48 This conclusion is
convincingly supported by a congressional determination that illegal gam-
bling activity provides a large portion of the revenue utilized in organized
criminal activity. 49 The Court additionally found that Congress viewed the
conspiracy prosecution as an effective weapon in the combat against organ-
ized crime.50 These findings clearly indicate that the general purpose
attributed to section 1955 by Congress is contrary to a 'presumption that
Wharton's Rule should be applied to bar a conspiracy conviction.
The Court made further use of its interpretation of legislative intent to
support two arguments. In the first argument the Court reasoned that the
dissimilarity between the activity inherent in an illegal gambling operation
and the kinds of activity found in traditional Wharton's Rule offenses
advised against an application of the rule to section 1955.r' In an examina-
tion of the activities prohibited by section 1955, the Court found that illegal
gambling activity involves participants fulfilling a variety of different roles.
These roles in turn generate additional agreements aimed at educating and
preparing an expanding number of participants to operate a complex
gambling organization. The Court emphasized that documented testimony
from the legislative history displays clear congressional concern for the
antisocial consequences resulting from engagement in this activity.52 This
emphasis suggests the Court found that individual interests protected by
Wharton's Rule are outweighed by society's interest in effective government
control of organized crime.53
In its second argument the Court ascertained that 'the five-party con-
certed activity requirement in section 195514 was dissimilar from the con-
certed activity requirement of traditional Wharton's Rule offenses. 55 Un-
like adultery or bribery, the activity prohibited by section 1955 can be main-
48. This method of statutory interpretation is consistent with prior cases holding
that the general purpose attributed to a statute by a legislature should be used as a guide
to a judicial interpretation of that statute. See United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354
(1925).
49. See Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 976, S. 1623, S. 1624, S. 1861, S. 2022,
S. 2122, S. 2292 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1969).
50. 95 S. Ct. at 1295-96, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 629. The Court is specifically referring
to the use of conspiracy by Congress in the language of § 1511. Id. The conclusion
is also supported by a study which indicates that prosecution for conspiracy "provides
an effective substantive tool with which to confront the criminal groups." PRESIDENT'S
CoMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 466 (1968).
51. The Court made note of the fact that the harm resulting from the commission
of a § 1955 offense reaches persons who are not participants in the offense. 95 S. Ct.
at 1293, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 627. Traditional application of Wharton's Rule was based on
the rationale that the conspiracy posed no additional dangers to society. See People v.
Purcell, 305 Ill. App. 215, 26 N.E.2d 153 (1940). Therefore, when the legislature has
displayed a concern for additional dangers to society posed by a conspiracy to commit
a particular crime, application of the rule is questionable. For a discussion see Note,
Wharton's Rule and Conspiracy To Operate an Illegal Gambling Business, 30 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 613 (1973).
52. Senator McClellan stated that "organized crime supports and promotes unor-
ganized crime." Hearings 86. See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 50 at 437-
86.
53. See note 46 supra.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970) only prohibits gambling activity involving five or more
persons.
55. 95 S. Ct. at 1293, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 626-27 (1975).
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tained with less than the number of participants required by the statute.56
The Court reasoned, therefore, that the requirement was merely for juris-
dictional purposes. The Court also pointed out that the requirements for
prosecution under section 1955 were designed to insure that only large-scale
gambling operations reaching interstate proportions would fall within the
purview of federal jurisdiction. 57 The Court's argument leads to the con-
clusion that the concerted activity requirement of section 1955 is only func-
tional and does not justify application of Wharton's Rule.58
The primary conflict between the majority and the dissent in lannelli
involves what the dissent terms the "rule of separability."' 9 Justice Douglas
argued that a conspiracy should be separated from its completed offense only
when prosecution for conspiracy will provide a sanction for dangers not
defined in the substantive crime. This argument suggests that the dissent
views merger to be the rule and separability an aid to discernment of
legislative intent. Unlike the majority, the dissent would separate a conspira-
cy only when legislative intent so warrants. Justice Douglas maintained that
the elements of conspiracy are inherent in a section 1955 offense. The
statute was designed primarily to provide prosecution for "syndicated gam-
bling," which Congress feared to be a forum for agreements to engage in
related criminal activities.6" In this light, section 1955 is primarily aimed at
the dangers posed by conspiracy. Based on this interpretation, the dissenting
opinion concluded that conspiracy to violate section 1955 should only be
charged as a preparatory offense which will merge with a conviction for the
completed crime.6
It is submitted that the dissent's juxtaposition of the "rule of separability"
with the majority's "judicial presumption" is inconsequential to a determina-
tion of the applicability of Wharton's Rule to section 1955. Whatever the
merits of such an argument, it is apparent that legislative intent must in the
end be the controlling factor.6 2 Legislative history for section 1955 demands
56. Most states have laws prohibiting gambling operations. However, Congress felt
that large-scale gambling activity could not be effectively controlled by state law enforce-
ment activities. Hearings 93.
57. 95 S. Ct. at 1296, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 630. See also Hearings 194.
58. This conclusion is contrary to that reached by the court in United States v. Fig-
ueredo, 350 F. Supp. 1031, 1036 (M.D. Fla. 1972), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
United States v. Vaglica, 490 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974); see note 29 supra and accom-
panying text.
59. 95 S. Ct. at 1297-98, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 632. The dissent also argues that the
holding of the majority is contrary to the Court's prior holdings regarding interpretation
of statutory language. In Lardner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 177 (1958), the Court
declared that congressional silence should be interpreted in favor of lenity. See also Bell
v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955). On another occasion, the Court stated that
attempts to expand the use of prosecutions for conspiracy will be viewed with disfavor.
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 404 (1957). Accordingly, the dissent would
strictly construe the statutory language of § 1955 in favor of an application of the rule.
95 S. Ct. at 1299-1300, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 634-35.
60. 95 S. Ct. at 1299, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 633. See also Hearings 86.
61. The disscnt argued that Wharton's Rule is based on principles of double jeo-pardy. 95 S. Ct. at 1297, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 631-32. The argument is based on the prem-
ise that a § 1955 conspiracy is provable by the same evidence used to establish commis-
sion of the substantive offense. The dissent views the conspiracy as an attempt which
merges with the completed crime. Id. at 1299, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 634.
62. Judicial construction of a statute should be consistent with legislative purpose.
United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 357 (1925).
1975]
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the achievement of goals 3 which both outweigh the policy considerations
underlying Wharton's Rule and distinguish section 1955 from the traditional
Wharton's Rule offenses. 4 The dissenting opinion fails to take into consider-
ation that the variety of activities prohibited by section 1955 include
agreements and criminal acts which may be performed by an array of
participants.65 These participants may be culpable in varying degrees."6 To
preclude a conviction for conspiracy in all cases would thwart clear legisla-




In lannelli the Supreme Court appears to resolve the controversy sur-
rounding the application of Wharton's Rule to a section 1955 prosecution.
Despite the fact that both section 1955 and the traditional Wharton's Rule
offense require concerted activity, the dangers to society posed by a section
1955 offense and the traditional Wharton's Rule offense are dissimilar. A
section 1955 agreement poses dangers to society separate and distinct from
those inherent in the substantive offense. It is consistent with sound legal
principles that Wharton's Rule should not preclude the use of the conspiracy
prosecution to guard against these additional dangers.
Perhaps the most significant feature of the majority's decision in lannelli is
its-definition of Wharton's Rule as a "judicial presumption." As this defini-
tion indicates, the rule will only be invoked when legislative intent is not to
the contrary. Accordingly, under the Jannelli holding substance is placed
before form; the similarity of required concerted activity between a modern
statute and traditional Wharton's Rule offenses is not to be controlling. When
legislative intent clearly demonstrates that an underlying purpose for a
modern statute would be thwarted by the application of Wharton's Rule to
that statute, the rule is to be given no effect.
Mark Zvonkovic
63. Federal prohibition of large-scale gambling operations is primarily a weapon
against organized crime. In this respect, Congress believed that a goal of § 1955 was
to guard against antisocial consequences of a more pervasive nature than the immediate
dangers posed by a gambling operation. Prosecution of the leaders of organized crime
will only result in a change of command. Accordingly, effective control of organized
crime must involve a method of attacking the organization's principal source of revenue.
Such revenue is provided by large-scale gambling operations. Hearings, supra note 49,
at 112.
64. The dangers to society attendant upon a traditional Wharton's Rule offense were
limited in comparison to those dangers posed by a violation of § 1955. See Note, supra
note 51, at 624-25.
65. Two persons may agree to promote an illegal gambling operation. Each of the
two persons may then separately contract with a variety of new participants to handle
aspects of the operation. These new participants will similarly bring persons into the
scheme. The possibilities are endless. The original conspirators could very well be sep-
arate from the five persons involved in operation of the business. See United States
v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 987 (4th Cir. 1973).
66. It is apparent that a coordinator of the various aspects of a complex gambling
operation is more culpable than the person maintaining a small segment of the operation
by receiving, for example, bets. See Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of
Group Crime or Protection of Individual Defendants, 62 HARv. L. REv. 276, 283-84
(1948).
67. Congress was primarily concerned with attacking the leaders of organized crime
and the sources of its revenue. See note 63 supra.
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Liability of Limited Partners
Participating in the Management of the Sole Corporate General
Partner-Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd.
In February of 1969 Neil G. Delaney and others leased land to Fidelity
Lease Ltd., a limited partnership consisting of a corporate general partner
and twenty-two limited partners. Three of Fidelity's limited partners were
officers, directors, and shareholders of the corporate general partner. The
lessors sued for breach of the lease, claiming that the three limited partners
who served as corporate officers were personally liable as general partners
because of their involvement in the management and control of the partner-
ship business. The trial court held, on motion for summary judgment, that
the three limited partners were not personally liable. The court of civil
appeals affirmed' and the plaintiffs appealed. Held, reversed and remand-
ed: A limited partner is liable as a general partner when he participates in
the control of the partnership business as an officer, director, and sharehold-
er of the corporate general partner. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 18 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 449 (July 23, 1975).
I. LIMITED PARTNERS AND THE EXERCISE OF CONTROL
A limited partnership consists of one or more general partners who
manage the partnership and have personal liability for partnership debts,
and one or more limited partners, who share in partnership profits and
whose liability is limited to their capital contributions to the partnership. 2
Limited liability is lost, however, if a limited partner takes part in the
"control" of partnership business.3 The control question presents significant
interpretive problems in situations falling between the extremes of the wholly
passive investor and the partner who manages the business on a day-to-day
basis. 4
1. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 517 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1974), rev'd, 18 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 449 (July 23, 1975).
2. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAw OF PARTNERSHIP 143 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as CRANE & BROMBERG].
3. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8 (1970). Section 7 of the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act has been adopted as section 8 in the Texas Act. The Texas
Uniform Partnership Act expressly authorizes the limited partner: (1) to inspect and
copy the partnership books; (2) to have, on demand, full information on all things af-
fecting the partnership; (3) to have the partnership dissolved by decree of court; and
(4) to receive a share in the profits or other compensation as provided for in the certif-
icate, and to receive the return of his capital contribution. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 6132a, § 11 (1970). If his name appears in the name of the partnership in viola-
tion of the statute, he will be liable to partnership creditors who extend credit to the
partnership without actual knowledge that the limited partner is not a general partner.
Id. § 6. He may also become liable if the partnership has not substantially complied
in good faith with the filing and publication requirements of the statute or if the certifi-
cate of limited partnership contains a false statement upon which the creditor relied to
his detriment. Id. § 7.




Control Prohibition Under Section 8. The Texas Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act specifically precludes a limited partner from taking an active part in
the control of the business." Unfortunately, the Act does not expressly define
"control" and the cases interpreting the term provide minimal guidance.8
Rather than establishing general standards for determining when a limited
partner has exercised control, the decisions approach each factual situation
on its merits, determining as a matter of law the consequences of the
partner's act.7 However, actual exercise of control rather than the right to
participate is necessary for the imposition of general liability. s
The courts have allowed the limited partners to exercise some degree of
influence in !the management of partnership affairs. Limited partners have
been allowed to designate the general sales manager of the partnership and
to jointly provide, with the general partner, for his financial support.9 A
limited partner can serve as a managing agent of a department of the firm
and deal on the same footing with the partnership as any outsider without
becoming liable as a general partner.10 Limited partners have been permit-
ted to give counsel and advice to general partners without being held liable
as general partners." However, there is no prior case law specifically
5. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8 (1970) provides: "A limited partner
shall not become liable as a general partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his
rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of the business."
6. See Plasteel Prods. Corp. v. Helman, 271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959); Bergeson
v. Life Ins. Corp. of America, 170 F. Supp. 150 (D. Utah 1958), modified on other
grounds, 265 F.2d 227 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 932 (1959); Grainger v.
Antoyan, 48 Cal. 2d 805, 313 P.2d 848 (1957); Silvola v. Rowlett, 129 Colo. 522, 272
P.2d 287 (1954); Rathke v. Griffith, 36 Wash. 2d 394, 218 P.2d 757 (1950); Strang
v. Thomas, 114 Wis. 599, 91 N.W. 237 (1902). See also Feld, supra note 4, at 1474.
The commentators agree that the biggest drawback of a limited partnership under the
ULPA is the ambiguity in the term "control." See, e.g., CRANE & BROMBERG 147; Com-
ment, "Control" in the Limited Partnership, 7 JOHN MARSHALL J. OF PRACTICE & PRO-
CEDURE 416, 419 (1974). Due to the difficulty experienced in interpreting the term
"control," California has amended its statute to give the limited partner the right to vote
on the election or removal of general partners, termination of the partnership, amend-
ment of the partnership agreement, and sale of all or substantially all of the assets of
the partnership. The powers are not exclusive of other powers which a limited partner
might enjoy without losing his protection against liability. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15507
(West Supp. 1975).
7. Comment, supra note 6, at 430; see Holtzman v. De Escamilla, 86 Cal. App.
2d 858, 195 P.2d 833 (1948), where limited partners who determined what crops should
be planted in a farming venture and who signed checks on firm bank accounts were par-
ticipating sufficiently in business to be held liable as general partners. See also Bergeson
v. Life Ins. Corp. of America, 170 F. Supp. 150 (D. Utah 1958), modified on other
grounds, 265 F.2d 227 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 932 (1959), holding that the
conduct involved subjected the "limited partners" to general liability. The court said
that the partnership's sole business was the organization and operation of the corpora-
tion, and all of the partners actively participated in the management of that corporation.
They cannot then rely on the corporate form when they have disregarded its spirit;
Strang v. Thomas, 114 Wis. 599, 91 N.W. 237 (1902), where limited partners were held
generally liable when they were empowered to elect three directors to a board of di-
rectors which would determine the business policies of the partnership.
8. See Plasteel Prods. Corp. v. Helman, 271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959); Rathke v.
Griffith, 36 Wash. 2d 394, 218 P.2d 757 (1950).
9. See Plasteel Prods. Corp. v. Helman, 271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959), where the
court emphasized the fact that the sales manager could be discharged at the sole discre-
tion of the general partner.
10. Grainger v. Antoyan, 48 Cal. 2d 805, 313 P.2d 848 (1957). The limited
partner was sales manager of the firm's new car department. He signed checks but had
no authority to set sales prices, trade-in values, or hire and fire.
11. See Silvola v. Rowlett, 129 Colo, 522, 272 P.2d 287 (1954). In Silvola the
court stated that by becoming a limited partner, the defendant did not lose his right to
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dealing with the issue of general liability where limited partners are serving
as officers, directors, and shareholders of the corporate general partner. 12
The limited partnership would be an extremely advantageous form of
business organization if the limited partner did not become liable as a
general partner solely because of his participation as an officer, director, or
shareholder of the corporate general partner. The use of a corporation as the
sole general partner with the limited partners participating in the guidance of
the corporation combines the primary advantages of both the partnership
and the corporation, allowing direct flow-through of profits and losses to the
limited partners for tax purposes, limited liability for general and limited
partners, and investor control of the partnership through the corporate entity
without loss by the investor of his privileged status."
Piercing the Corporate Veil. Texas courts traditionally regarded limited
liability as a highly privileged status, resulting in their holding potential
incorporators to the strictest standards and frequently leading to the piercing
of the corporate veil.' 4 However, the courts have attempted to retreat from
this trend, and it is now generally held, subject to certain exceptions, that the
corporate entity, along with attendant corporate benefits, will be recog-
nized. 15 Courts sometimes find it necessary to hold the shareholders person-
ally liable for corporate liabilities when the corporate form has been used for
a purpose not encompassed by the statutes providing for incorporation.' 6
Before the corporate veil will be pierced, the facts of the case must indicate
that the equities justify disregard of corporateness.' 7 In Texas this requires a
substantial identity of interest between the individual shareholders and the
corporation, and a likelihood that the corporation is being used to achieve an
advise and counsel the general partner on partnership related transactions, when asked
by the general partner.
12. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 517 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1974), rev'd, 18 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 449 (July 23, 1975). See also Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-
1 CuM. BULL. 735 (1972), where it is stated that the Internal Revenue Service will not
issue an opinion letter as to partnership status if the limited partners own, individually
or in the aggregate, more than twenty percent of the stock of the corporate general part-
ner.
13. Comment, supra note 6, at 428.
14. Minchen v. Van Trease, 425 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston[14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.), where the court stated: "While Texas courts may
be somewhat more lenient than those of other jurisdictions in disregarding the corporate
entity, the reasons for so doing have been well enumerated." See H. HENN, LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 146 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as HENN].
15. See HENN 252 n.10.
16. Id. See First Nat'l Bank v. Gamble, 134 Tex. 112, 132 S.W.2d 100 (1939)(corporate entity disregarded for its use as a means to perpetuate a fraud); Hartnett v.
Shirah, 116 Tex. 164, 287 S.W. 902 (1926) (corporate entity used as a means to avoid
punishment for a crime and thus disregarded by the court); Witherspoon Oil Co. v.
State, 156 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1941, no writ) (disregarded due to
its use as a means to circumvent a statute); Bush v. Gaffney, 84 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1935, no writ) (corporate entity disregarded when found to be a
mere alter ego of its shareholders); Gamer Paper Co. v. Tuscany, 264 S.W. 132 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1924, writ dism'd) (corporate entity disregarded for its use as
a means to evade an existing legal obligation). See also Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied
Chem. Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1968); Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364
S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1962); Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 155 Tex. 179, 284 S.W.2d 340 (1955);
Houston-American Life Ins. Co. v. Tate, 358 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1962,
no writ).




inequitable result so ithat adherence to the corporate fiction would sanction
a fraud or promote injustice.' 8 Further, the courts often consider whether
corporate formalities have been duly observed'9 and whether the corpora-
tion is adequately capitalized. 20 Generally, the courts in Texas seem to
regard shareholder liability as an exceptional remedy and, as to corporations,
limited liability as the rule rather than the exception. 2'
II. DELANEY V. FIDELITY LEASE LTD.
In Delaney the plaintiffs contended that the three limited partners should
be held personally liable, thus raising two issues: whether the participation
by the three limited partners in the corporate general partner falls under
section 8 of the Texas Uniform Limited Partnership Act,22 which prohibits
management and control of a partnership by limited partners, and whether
the corporate veil of the general partner should be pierced due to its use as a
means to circumvent a statute. 23
In holding the defendants personally liable, the court found that by
participating in the affairs of the partnership through the sole corporate
general partner, the limited partners violated the prohibition of section 8.24
18. 1 I. HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS § 5 (1942). See also Ross v. Commis-
sioner, 129 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1942); In re Charles K. Horton, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 905
(S.D. Tex. 1938); First Nat'l Bank v. Gamble, 134 Tex. 112, 132 S.W.2d 100 (1939).
An analogy may be drawn to treatment, for federal income tax purposes, of dummy cor-
porations formed as real estate holding companies. For a discussion of the elements
involved in the determination of whether the corporate entity should be disregarded, see
Tilley, Dummy Corporations, 33 TEx. B.J. 445 (1970); Moline Properties Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); Tomlinson v. Miles, 316 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1963);
Jackson v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1956); Paymer v. Commissioner, 150
F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945). In all of these cases the courts considered the level of busi-
ness activity of the corporation and the business purpose it supposedly served in deter-
mining whether or not it was a sham to be disregarded for tax purposes.
19. Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co., 526 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas
1975, no writ).
20. See HENN § 73.
21. Radio KBUY, Inc. v. Lieurance, 390 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1965, no writ), discussed in 19 R. HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 234 (1973).
[hereinafter cited as HAMILTON].
22. Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8 (1970).
23. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 18 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 449 (July 23, 1975). The
court of appeals had also considered the power of the corporation to act as the sole gen-
eral partner in a limited partnership. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 517 S.W.2d 420
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974), rev'd, 18 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 449 (July 23, 1975). The
supreme court expressly reserved any decision on this question, indicating that the issue
was not properly before the court. 18 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 451. Texas case law indicates
that absent a charter or statute specifically allowing it, corporations cannot enter into
a partnership because to do so would be against public policy. See, e.g., Port Arthur
Trust Co. v. Muldrow, 155 Tex. 612, 291 S.W.2d 312 (1956); Luling Oil & Gas Co.
v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 144 Tex. 475, 191 S.W.2d 716 (1945); J. Robert Neal, Inc.
v. McElveen, 320 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, no writ); Sabine Tram
Co. v. Bancroft, 40 S.W. 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, writ ref'd). However, the express
grant of power to a corporation to join in a partnership found in article 2.02A(18) of
the Texas Business Corporation Act and the implications arising from the application
of the UPA's definition of "persons," which includes corporations, to the ULPA suggest
that strong support exists for allowing a corporation to serve as the sole general partner
in a limited partnership. A unique problem is raised, however, in that the policy of
requiring someone in the partnership to be personally liable is easily avoided by having
a corporation with its limited liability by virtue of corporate law serve as the sole general
partner. See CRANE & BROMBERG 146. No case law or statute deals specifically with
this problem; however, there is authority that it is entirely permissible for a corporation
to serve as the only general partner in a limited partnership. See HAMILTON § 212.
24. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 18 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 449 (July 23, 1975).
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The court expressly rejected the defendants' contention that the "control"
test should be coupled with a determination of whether the plaintiffs relied
upon the limited partners' holding themselves out as general partners with
unlimited liability.25' The court strictly interpreted section 8 and reasoned
that since the section made no mention of any requirement of reliance by
third parties, no such finding was necessary to hold the limited partners
personally liable. 26  The court completely disregarded the facts that the
plaintiffs were aware of the corporate nature of the general partner and that
the limited partners acted solely in their capacities as officers and directors of
the corporate general partner and not in any individual capacity.
A conflict seems to exist between the policy behind section 8, which
appears to require unlimited liability for anyone, including limited partners,
participating in the management of the partnership,2 7 and the theory that
corporations, with the limited liability of their shareholders, 28 officers, 29 and
directors30 may act as general partners of a limited partnership.3I The most
effective means of resolving this conflict, as suggested by several authorities
and some case law, is to interpret section 8 as providing for personal liability
where third party creditors have been misled to believe that the limited
partners with whom they are dealing will be personally liable, rather than
strictly interpreting section 8 as imposing personal liability upon anyone
participating in the management of the firm.3 2 This approach is similar to
that used when corporate officers hold themselves out to be personally liable
25. Id. at 450. The court cited Bergeson v. Life Ins. Corp. of America, 170 F.
Supp. 150 (D. Utah 1958), modified on other grounds, 265 F.2d 227 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 932 (1959), as support for finding the limited partners personally liable
under section 8. Bergeson can be clearly distinguished from Delaney on the ground that
fraud was the predominant basis for the decision in Bergeson but was not present in
Delaney. The two cases can also be distinguished on the grounds that in Bergeson op-
eration of the corporation was the sole purpose of the partnership, and as officers of
that corporation, the limited partners were directly involved in the management of the
partnership. In Delaney, however, the corporation was the general partner, and as di-
rectors and officers of that corporation the limited partners were only indirectly in-
volved in the management of the partnership.
26. 18 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 450.
27. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8 (1970).
28. Blond Lighting Fixture Supply Co. v. Funk, 392 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1965, no writ); National Hotel Co. v. Motley, 123 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1938, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
29. Russell v. Edgewood Independent School Dist., 406 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
30. Id.
31. No case law specifically holds that a corporation may serve as sole general part-
ner in a limited partnership, and the court in Delaney has expressly reserved any opin-
ion on this issue. However, implied and expressed statutory authority exists for such
an arrangement and several writers have stated belief in its legality. See note 25 supra.
32. Feld, supra note 4, at 1479; see UNIFORM LIMrrED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1, Com-
missioner's Note (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1974); Note, Business Associations-Uniform
Limited Partnership Act-Activities Making a Limited Partner Liable as a General
Partner, 56 MIcH. L. REV. 285, 286-87 n.13 (1957); Comment, supra note 6, at 428.
Weil v. Diversified Properties, 319 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1970); Grainger v. Antoyan,
48 Cal. 2d 805, 313 P.2d 848 (1957); Rathke v. Griffith, 36 Wash. 2d 394, 218 P.2d
757 (1950). See also Comment, supra note 6, at 427, where it is stated that case law
interpreting the meaning of "control" under section 8 indicates that limited partners are
personally liable only when creditors are led to believe that the limited partners are
serving as general partners. Note, Limited Partnerships-Absent Creditor Reliance, a
Limited Partner Who Is a Director of the Corporate General Partner Is Not Personally
Liable for Partnership Obligations, 6 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1171, 1175 (1975).
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on debts they incur, but later attempt to use the corporate fiction to shield
themselves from personal liability. 3
In finding the limited partners personally liable under section 8, and
rejecting the proposed theory that liability under -the section requires not only
"control" but also the reliance of a third party, the court seemed to reason,
through a strict interpretation of section 8, that public policy is violated when
a partner retains his privileged status of limited liability while possessing the
ability ,to "control." This reasoning appears incorrect in light of -the Commis-
sioner's note to the ULPA84 and the proposed revision of this section of the
UPLA,35 both of which expressly state that public policy is not violated by
combining control with limited liability as long as partnership creditors are
not deceived. 36 Under this view only those activities which could produce
reasonable reliance by third parties, such as direct supervision of partnership
activities, should produce personal liability.3 7 As long as there is full disclo-
sure and no misrepresentation, no inequity should result from allowing a
corporation to be used as a general partner in a limited partnership and
permitting limited partners to serve as officers of the corporation without
losing their limited liability.38 At first glance this approach may appear
contrary to the correlation of personal liability with control contained in
section 8.39 The purpose of this correlation, however, is to protect those
persons dealing with the limited partnership who assume that the partners
managing the affairs of the partnership are personally liable.40 When full
disclosure exists as in Delaney, third parties are aware of the limited liability
33. See Abraham v. Prewitt Printing Co., 330 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1959, no writ); Hauser v. Layne, 131 S.W. 1156 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, no writ); Marx
v. Luling Co-op Ass'n, 43 S.W. 596 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, writ ref'd).
34. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1974).
The note states:
No public policy requires a person who contributes to the capital of a busi-
ness, acquires an interest in the profits, and some degree of control over
the conduct of the business, to become bound for the obligations of the
business; provided creditors have no reason to believe at the times their
credits were extended that such person was so bound.
35. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1974). The pro-
posed draft states:
A limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless, in
addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he
takes part in the control of the business, and then only to persons who
transact business with the limited partnership reasonably believing that
the limited partner is a general partner.
36. See Note, Limited Partnerships-Absent Creditor Reliance, a Limited Partner
Who Is a Director of the Corporate General Partner Is Not Personally Liable for
Partnership Obligations, 6 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1171, 1174 (1975), where this line of
reasoning was used in discussing the court of appeals decision in Delaney.
37. Feld, supra note 4, at 1479.
38. This form of limited partnership would be similar to a close corporation, whose
directors and officers are often the only shareholders of the corporation and who have
a voice in the management of the corporation but retain their limited liability. See
HENN § 203. In practice this analogy is not totally accurate. The officers of these
close corporations are frequently required to give their personal guarantees when dealing
with third parties. A. Bromberg, Partnership Primer 26 (1961) (unpublished paper in
Southern Methodist University Law School Library).
39. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a (1970).
40. See Feld, supra note 4, at 1479; Comment, supra note 6, at 427; Note, supra
note 36, at 1174.
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of the partners with whom they are dealing and the risks they will be
assuming. 41
The court also considered the defendants' contention that they acted solely
through the corporate general partner when handling partnership affairs and
that the corporation actually controlled the business of the limited partner-
ship.42  It rejected the defendants' arguments concerning the protection
yielded the limited partners through the corporate shield, and reasoned that
this corporation was organized solely as a vehicle to circumvent section 8.4 3
The court expressly adopted statements from the dissenting opinion in the
court of civil appeals asserting that the corporation had no other function
except to operate the limited partnership, leading to the inseparability of the
partners' acts as limited partners and as officers of the corporation. 44 Thus,
the limited partners were indirectly, if not directly, exercising control over
the partnership. 45 The court also reasoned that a corporation should not be
permitted to shield the limited partners from personal liability since this
could result in the limited partners operating the partnership through a
corporate general partner with inadequate capitalization and minimal liabili-
ty.46
The court's analysis on the issue of piercing the corporate veil appears
unsound. The court failed to consider the absence of allegations regarding
deception, misrepresentation, or inadequate capitalization of the corporation
at the time the lease was created. 47 Ordinarily, a major factor in determining
whether the shareholder or a third party creditor should bear the loss is
whether the third party dealt voluntarily with the corporation. 4 In Delaney
the plaintiffs were fully aware that they were dealing with a corporate
"shell" and of the risks involved, and thus a voluntary dealing between two
equal parties resulted in the execution of a contract. 49 Had the plaintiffs
desired further assurances they should have insisted upon personal guaran-
tees of the officers of the corporate general partner.50 Having failed to do so,
they should not have been allowed to succeed in having the corporate entity
disregarded.
The theory that the corporate entity is separate and distinct from its
shareholders provides the traditional basis for the concept of limited liability
of shareholders. 1 In accordance with this theory the majority of jurisdictions
41. Moreover, it is not unusual for contracts between third parties and limited
partnerships to contain exculpatory clauses exempting the general partner from personal
liability.
42. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 18 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 449 (July 23, 1975).
43. Id. at 450.
44. Id.
45. Id. The court implied that if the corporation had some reason for existing other
than to manage the partnership, the corporate entity might not have been disregarded.
46. Id. The corporate entity is frequently disregarded where a corporation is inade-
quately capitalized or dominated by few individuals. See note 27 supra and accompany-
ing text.
47. 18 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 450.
48. See HAMILTON § 234.
49. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 18 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 449 (July 23, 1975).
50. See generally HAMILTON § 234. See also Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1968), discussed in Note, Corporations-Piercing the Cor-
porate Veil, 23 Sw. L.J. 384 (1969).
51. See HENN § 146.
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allow incorporation for the purpose of avoiding general liability on the
grounds that limited liability is one of the principal objectives of incorpora-
tion.562 To disallow the privilege of incorporation on grounds that it was
being used to avoid general liability would seem to make the whole process
of incorporation illusory.53 In light of this and the previously mentioned
authority stating that limited liability is the rule rather than the exception54
and that in order for the corporate entity to be disregarded, adherence to it
must lead to a fraud or promote injustice,55 the court's holding of piercing
the corporate veil appears unfounded.
III. CONCLUSION
In finding the limited partners personally liable through a strict interpreta-
tion of section 8 the court in Delaney has taken a position inconsistent with
the opinions and proposals of many noted authorities and with sound legal
analysis. The court expressly rejected the theory that, along with control,
there must be the reliance of a third party before personal liability under
section 8 will be imposed. In doing so, the court seems to reject the most
effective means of alleviating the apparent conflict between section 8's
provision for personal liability of those in control and the statutory provision
of limited liability for shareholders which arises when a corporation serves as
a general partner in a limited partnership. The best explanation for the
opinion seems to be that the court felt the defendants had gone too far in
setting up a corporation which had no apparent purpose except to act as a
shield of protection for limited partners who desired to have some manage-
rial influence over ,the affairs of the limited partnership without losing their
limited liability. However, absent misrepresentation or reliance of third
parties, there appears to be no valid theoretical or practical reason for
holding these limited partners personally liable.
The court also found the limited partners personally liable by reasoning
that the corporation was formed for the sole purpose of circumventing a
statute and avoiding personal liability. The court reached this decision
despite the facts that the corporation was adequately capitalized, the plain-
52. Id. Contra, Bond-Reed Hardware Co. v. Walsh, 193 S.W. 1148 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1917, writ ref'd); Oriental Inv. Co. v. Barclay, 25 Tex. Civ. App.
543, 64 S.W. 80 (1901, writ ref'd). These cases can be distinguished from Delaney on
the basis that fraud was present in both but not in Delaney.
53. See HAMILTON § 234 where it is stated: "For example despite the language
about 'avoiding liability' it is well established that shareholder liability will not result
even when . . . the corporation was formed for the specific purpose of limiting or es-
caping liability. Any other conclusion would make the whole process of incorporation
a snare or a delusion." The leading cases in Texas in which the courts have disre-
garded the corporate entity on the basis that the corporation was formed as a sham to
circumvent a statute involved statutes dealing with tax regulations and dummy corpora-
tions set up solely as a means of realizing certain tax advantages. See State v. Ratliff,
200 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ ref'd); Fleming Hosp., Inc. v. Wil-
liams, 169 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.); Witherspoon
Oil Co. v. State, 156 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.);
H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Sheppard, 137 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1940, writ
ref'd). For further discussion of related cases see note 18 supra.
54. Radio KBUY, Inc. v. Lieurance, 390 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1965, no writ).
55. See 1 I. HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS § 5 (1942).
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tiffs were fully aware of the limited liability of the defendants, and the
plaintiffs had every opportunity to ask the individual defendants for further
assurances such as personal guarantees but failed to do so. By this liberal
application of the theory of piercing the corporate veil, the court seems to
negate the efforts of legislators to make limited liability more easily available
when it is fully disclosed. This decision appears to present a threat not only
to limited partners, but also to persons participating as shareholders in a small
or close corporation, even though adequately capitalized and operating with-
out any misrepresentations to its creditors, but set up principally as a means
of avoiding personal liability.
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ni lthpn Methodist tUnvesty DlaTxs72SSehnnl of T.RW Da as Te s757
8. KNOWN BONDHOLDERS. MORTGAGEES. AND OTHER SECURITY HOLDERS OWNING OR PILDING 1 PERCENT OR MORE OF
TOTAL AMOUNT OF BONDS, MORTGAGES OR OTHER SECURITIES (I
t 
them a none .10 SBot,)
NAME IAOGRESS
9. FOR OPTIONAL COMPLETION BY PUBLISHERS MAILING AT THE REGULAR RATES (Section 132.121, Postal S-I-e Moaal)
39 U. S. C. 32 611odes In pertnena pa:N who would hie been anttled 1o mall Catter unoe former wntion 4359 of this titl.
shall maI such matter at th:.ats I oided title, tlhs lubtction unlon he files annal with the Postal Seroice a writan request for
prmission to mail matt-r at such rates.'
In accordan e with the paoisions of this tatute. I hereby rtqueat permission to Caill the publicilon named In Item I at the reduced postage
rats prestntly athorized by 39 U. S. C. 3626.
(Signatre and title of editor. Publisher. business mne patn
Managing Editor
10. FOR COMPLETION BY NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AUTHORIZED TO MAIL AT S SCIAL 11 TIES (Seytion 132.122 Potl Smit
Manuel) (Check . I.
The purpos, function, and nonprofit of this [ Have not changed Haw changed , ng (If cohangedb, pblae moat
or.nlzetion and aha aampt status fa Federal [X durl patlnB W preceding 12 months submleplnli.on of change
ncom ,a purposas 12 onth wItS Ibis statemenl.)
AVERAGE NO. COPIES ACTUAL NUMBER OF COPIES OF11. EXTENT AND NATURE OF CIRCULATION EACH ISSUE DURING SINGLE ISSUE PUBLISHED NEAR-
PRECEDING 12 MONTHS ESTTO FILING DATS
A. TOTAL NO. COPIES PRINTED (Net Press Run) 1874 1632
B. PAID CIRCULATION
1. SALES THROUGH DEALERS AND CARRIERS. STREET 200 167
VENDORS AND COUNTER SALES
2. MAIL SUBSCRIPTIONS 1180 1161
C. TOTAL PAID CIRCULATION 1380 1328
D. FREE DISTRIBUTION BY MAIL, CARRIER OR OTHER MEANS
SAMPLES, COMPLIMENTARY, AND OTHER FREE COPIES 63 21
E. TOTAL DISTRIBUTION (Sum ofC and D) 144-3 1349
F. COPIES NOT DISTRIBUTED
1. OFFICE USE. LEFT-OVER. UNACCOUNTED. SPOILED 431 283
AFTER PRINTING
2. RETURNS FROM NEWS AGENTS
.0. TOTAL (Sum ofE & F-hould ealu et press run shown inA) 1874 1632
SIGNATURE OF SOiTOR PUBLISHER. BUSINESS MANAGER.I certify that the statemens made by me above ae corect VIAOWNEI . Managing
Snd complete. l,,n± A s.a ., Editor
PIS o9 352r (Page I) (See lIt fitlons on1 rene) /
